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Over multiple response opportunities, recall may be inconsistent. For example, an eyewitness may report
information at trial that was not reported during initial questioning—a phenomenon called reminiscence. Such
inconsistencies are often assumed by lawyers to be inaccurate and are sometimes interpreted as evidence of
the general unreliability of the rememberer. In two experiments, we examined the output-bound accuracy of
inconsistent memories and found that reminisced memories were indeed less accurate than memories that
were reported consistently over multiple opportunities. However, reminisced memories were just as accurate as
memories that were reported initially but not later, indicating that it is the inconsistency of recall, and not the
later addition to the recall output, that predicts lower accuracy. Finally, rememberers who exhibited more
inconsistent recall were less accurate overall, which, if confirmed by more ecologically valid studies, may
indicate that the common legal assumption may be correct: Witnesses who provide inconsistent testimony
provide generally less trustworthy information overall.
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The legal system often asks witnesses to describe an event
on multiple occasions and relies on witnesses to recount
events consistently each time they are asked. This expect-
ation reflects a misguided perspective on the fragile nature
of retrieval. In two experiments, we show that repeated at-
tempts to recall a single list of items leads to many inconsist-
encies. Such inconsistently reported information is less
accurate, a finding that is consistent with the expectations
and behavior of lawyers in the courtroom. However, it does
not matter whether such inconsistencies are reported on an
early test and forgotten on a later one, or omitted on an
early test and first introduced on a later one. This fact sug-
gests that details introduced during trial should not be
viewed with any greater suspicion than details reported be-
fore trial but forgotten during trial. Importantly, people who* Correspondence: sestanl2@illinois.edu
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifhad more inconsistencies in their recall also exhibited lower
accuracy even in the information that they consistently
recalled, suggesting that less credence should be placed on
an eyewitness’s entire account if they produce many incon-
sistencies. These results, taken together, indicate ways in
which certain problems in eyewitness memory can be more
profitably addressed with a combination of applied research
that is superficially similar to the conditions under study
and use-inspired, focused basic research that takes advan-
tages of well-established paradigms and high levels of ex-
perimental control.Background
In the American justice system, witnesses to a crime are
generally asked to repeat their account of an incident nu-
merous times: to the police, in a disposition, in meetings
with attorneys, and in court. When recounting a story so
many times, and under such varied conditions, discrepan-
cies are likely to occur. Such inconsistencies are oftenis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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ness. Lawyers search for inconsistencies in witnesses’ ac-
counts and use them to attack witnesses’ credibility (Alavi
& Ahmad, 2002; Kerper, 1997), drawing their entire testi-
mony into question. The technique is quite effective: A
study using mock trials found that mock jurors exposed to
inconsistent testimony found the eyewitness less effective
and the defendant less culpable, and, as a consequence,
they were less likely to convict (Berman & Cutler, 1996).
Despite the legal implications, surprisingly little research
has been done to investigate the relationship between
consistency and accuracy of recall. Basic memory research
does not commonly focus on the form of accuracy relevant
to this scenario, a form sometimes called output-bound ac-
curacy (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). Output-bound accuracy
is to be contrasted with the type of accuracy that is typically
referred to in laboratory studies, which can be called
input-bound accuracy. Input-bound accuracy refers to
the proportion of studied items that are successfully
recalled (i.e., the number of correctly recalled items di-
vided by the number of things originally studied). This
measure of memory is used in the vast majority of basic
laboratory research on memory and places an emphasis
on the amount of correct information reported about
an event (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). In eyewitness lit-
erature, this is often referred to as completeness, as it
reflects how thoroughly a witness describes an event.
(This is the “whole truth” part of the famous oath used
in U.S. courts.) Output-bound accuracy refers to the
percentage of the items recalled that are correct (i.e.,
the number of correct things recalled divided by the
total number of things recalled). This is the “nothing
but the truth” part of the oath and is more relevant in
circumstances where the specific details of the original
event are unknown, such as the eyewitness scenario we
have been relying on here. It reflects how much of a
witness’s testimony is true. In this paper, when we talk
about the accuracy of a memory, we mean specifically
its output-bound accuracy.
Most of the relevant research on the relationship be-
tween consistency and accuracy can be found in the eye-
witness memory literature. This research uses paradigms
that, as we detail below, provide challenging circum-
stances under which to evaluate the accuracy of recall. It
is thus perhaps not surprising that there are inconsisten-
cies among those reports. The goal of the present research
is to use the many advantages of very basic laboratory
memory research to complement the small amount of ap-
plied work on this interesting problem.
An additional important distinction is related to the
types of inconsistencies across multiple recall opportun-
ities. Here we can distinguish between two general types:
forgotten details, which are provided in an earlier account
and omitted in a later one, and reminisced details, whichare included in a later account but not mentioned in prior
accounts.1 Note here that forgotten details are not ones
that were never reported, but rather ones reported at least
once and then omitted in later testimony. The focus of re-
search on the consistency of recall has been on reminis-
cence, probably because forgetting but not reminiscence is
compatible with the well-accepted notion that memory
declines over time (Erdelyi, 2010).
Inconsistent recall could reflect a number of estab-
lished psychological phenomena. One possibility is that
rememberers may be more willing to report memories
that they are unsure about on later opportunities than
on earlier ones. Such a shift in reporting policy would
result in new details or new memories being included in
later testimony (cf. Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Another
possibility is that exposure to postevent information
from another source leads to changes in testimony
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), or that poste-
vent information reminds the rememberer of forgotten
aspects of the original event (Benjamin & Ross, 2011;
Benjamin & Tullis, 2010; Tullis, Benjamin, & Ross,
2014). Yet another possibility is that reminiscence oc-
curs simply because there is more cumulative retrieval
time on later than on earlier retrieval attempts, an explan-
ation Roediger and Thorpe (1978) proposed to account
for hypermnesia (the enhancement of memory over mul-
tiple recall tests that is seen when reminiscence exceeds
forgetting). None of these perspectives can also explain
why details are sometimes reported and then omitted at a
later date.
However, one general perspective, widely accepted
in the memory literature, provides a straightforward
explanation of both forgetting and reminiscence with-
out reference to additional events or mechanisms. By
that view, the success of any retrieval event is a prod-
uct of both the cues available during retrieval and the
ones experienced during encoding (Tulving & Thomson,
1973). In an eyewitness situation, the various retrieval
attempts may take place under highly varying physical,
mental, and emotional conditions, all of which can
serve as retrieval cues. As retrieval cues change, details
that were once recalled may become inaccessible and
details that were inaccessible may be recalled (see also
Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009). Such fluctuation is a
well-accepted theoretical mechanism for spontaneous
recovery of previously extinguished associations in
animal behavior, and can be straightforwardly applied
to human recall as well (Estes, 1955; see also Bower,
1972).
If inconsistent recall reflects the fluctuation of cues
across retrieval situations, then two effects should be
apparent. First, details that are recalled across situa-
tions are more likely to be accurate than inconsistently
recalled details, because those memories have proven
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Second, reminisced details should not be less likely to
be accurate than forgotten ones. Any differences in ac-
curacy between reminisced and forgotten details that
have been reported in the literature may be due to a
confounding with the elapsed time since the original
encoding event for those two effects. Because cues are
thought to fluctuate with time, an attempted retrieval
at a more distant point is less likely to overlap with
those present during encoding.
From the cue fluctuation perspective, reminisced mem-
ories differ from forgotten memories only insofar as they
are first produced after a longer retention interval—the
fact that they are produced after a failed attempt at re-
trieval gives them no special status. Consequently, both
forgotten and reminisced details should be less accurate
than consistently recalled details, but there is no reason to
expect that they should be different from one another
once the retention interval is controlled. It is for this rea-
son that we take great care in our experiment to control
for the retention interval.
We also seek to control for other sources of inconsist-
ency in recall. Our use of the same free recall task across
tests minimizes the possibility of shifts in reporting
policy, as do our relatively short retention intervals.
The introduction of postevent information is eliminated
by keeping subjects in the laboratory between tests.
Reminding is reduced by placing demanding but unrelated
distractor tasks between all of the experimental events.
We minimize the influence of total retrieval time by for-
cing subjects to recall for an extended period on each of
the individual tests. As will become clear, inconsistencies
are still ample under these conditions, suggesting that cue
fluctuation may provide a more coherent explanation of
the relevant phenomena.
A basic understanding of the relationship between ac-
curacy and consistency is important in part because the
American legal system tends to make assumptions about
the accuracy of inconsistent witnesses. First, it is assumed
that inconsistent details are inaccurate (Fisher et al., 2009).
Second, it is assumed that some types of inaccuracies are
worse than others. This is particularly true of reminisced
memories, which lawyers are trained to use to discredit
the witness in a process known in the legal community as
“impeachment by omission” (McElhaney, 1987). This
effect finds some support in the memory literature as
well: Untrained observers expect reminisced memories
to be much lower in accuracy than consistently pro-
duced information, and even to be lower in accuracy
than they actually are (Oeberst, 2012). Trained detec-
tives exhibit the same bias (Krix, Sauerland, Lorei, &
Rispens, 2015). Third, it is assumed that inconsistent
testimony is indicative of an unreliable witness—that is,
that their entire testimony should be called into question,and not just the inconsistent parts. A fourth assumption
follows from the third: that inconsistent testimony should
be uncommon.
Three reports in the eyewitness memory literature bear
on these issues directly (Brock, Fisher, & Cutler, 1999;
Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Oeberst, 2015). Gilbert and
Fisher (2006) had subjects watch short mock crime videos;
the subjects were then interviewed on two separate oc-
casions. When comparing these two interviews, they
found that inconsistencies were ubiquitous, with 98 %
of all subjects reminiscing at least two details. On aver-
age, subjects recalled 20.4 details consistently, remi-
nisced 8.4 details on the second test, and forgot 9.2
details from the first test to the second.2 Consistently
recalled items were in fact significantly more accurate
than forgotten items, which were in turn significantly
more accurate than reminisced items; however, the ac-
curacy of all the reported items was high. Brock and
colleagues (1999) used a similar procedure: Subjects
viewed a video of a traffic accident and were then inter-
viewed twice (using the cognitive interview method;
Fisher et al., 2009). They found that forgotten details
were less likely to be accurate than consistently recalled
details. (They did not examine reminisced details.) A
third study using a video of a theft found that reminisced
and forgotten details exhibited similar levels of accuracy,
and were only slightly lower than those evidenced by
consistent details (Krix et al., 2015). A similar pattern
was reported by Oeberst (2015), evaluated memory for
a live event in a classroom.
The use of an eyewitness task to evaluate memory
consistency has costs and benefits. On the plus side, the
generalization from these results to actual eyewitness
memory is more straightforward than if a more trad-
itional list-based laboratory memory task had been used.
On the other hand, aspects of the procedure lead to
questions about validity that might be more easily re-
solved in a list memory task and the controls that it af-
fords. Most importantly, it is difficult to objectively
define a “detail” in a report of a witnessed event. If a
subject reports that a suspect wore pants and then later
that the suspect wore jeans, is that a consistent report
(because they reported the pants on both occasions) or a
reminiscence (because there is an additional detail on
the second report that the pants are made of denim)?
Additionally, details may not be independent—remem-
bering some details may allow for logical deductions
about other details. Furthermore, not all of the details
are of equal importance: Some may be trivial and
others crucial. If a subject reports the presence of a
blue sky, is it reasonable to consider that a relevant
detail? All of these difficulties may be the source of
some of the inconsistencies between the results in the
prior literature—it is unclear from those papers, for
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than reminisced details or of equivalent accuracy.
These problems are easily solved by moving to a list-
based memory task, where the number and labels for
the memoranda are clear and subjects know exactly what
they are expected to report. Moreover, in a list-based task,
items are independent and of roughly equal importance.
This research is thus best considered to be use-inspired
rather than applied. Our task does not “look like” an
eyewitness memory event, but the basic findings may
be relevant to those situations, especially if confirmed
by a wider variety of designs. As with all such research,
there may be factors involved in real-world eyewitness
situations that limit the generalizability of the results of
our work.
Only one experiment that we know of in the literature
(Oeberst, 2012; Experiment 1) used a list-based proced-
ure and examined the relationship between accuracy and
consistency of recall. In that experiment, reminisced
items were not found to be less accurate than consist-
ently recalled items, a result inconsistent with all of the
results from eyewitness paradigms reviewed earlier.
Our procedure uses a three-test design, which enables
us to additionally evaluate whether an item reminisced
early (say, during a deposition) is more likely to be accur-
ate than an item reminisced later (say, during court). We
know of no extant literature examining this question. Our
experiments use a unique two-group, three-block proced-
ure that enables control of key potential confounders in
making this comparison.
A related question that follows from an investigation
of accuracy and consistency concerns individual differ-
ences. Do people who report more inconsistent details
exhibit lower accuracy for the consistently recalled ma-
terial that they produce? Gilbert and Fisher (2006) found
a small negative correlation that was not statistically
significant relating the number of inconsistencies and
the accuracy of the rest of the testimony. However, that
analysis suffers from the same potential measurement
difficulties discussed earlier—a fact that may make
small correlations difficult to detect. Taken at face
value, the lack of a statistically significant correlation
would cast doubt on the commonly held belief that in-
consistent witnesses are not trustworthy. Yet, the cue
fluctuation perspective, combined with individual differ-
ences, would seem to predict that inconsistent recall
should be related to lower accuracy among consistently
recalled items. If subjects vary in their willingness to re-
port a memory when the mnemonic evidence is uncertain
(as we know they do; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), then
some of the variance in the number of inconsistencies
produced will reflect differences in a reporting criterion.
Rememberers with a lower reporting criterion will ex-
hibit overall lower accuracy (because of the additionof low-confidence reports to the protocol) and also
produce more inconsistent details (because the exact
content of those low-confidence reports will be more
likely to vary with fluctuations in cues). Consequently,
in contrast to the past research, we expect to see a
positive relationship between accuracy and consistency
across subjects.
In our experiments, we set out to evaluate three ques-
tions that follow directly from the prior literature and
the cue fluctuation perspective:
1. Are inconsistently recalled items less accurate than
consistent items?
2. Do reminisced and forgotten items exhibit similar
levels of accuracy when the time of production is
controlled?
3. Do people who demonstrate more inconsistent
recall have lower overall accuracy, even for items
that are recalled consistently?
We choose to evaluate these relationships using list-
learning tasks. To this end, we had subjects study com-
mon items, thus rendering the scoring (almost) completely
objective and eliminating the aforementioned concerns re-
garding evaluating recall of mock crimes.
One confound ubiquitous in prior research is the dif-
ferent production times for items that were reminisced or
forgotten. By definition, in a two-test design, reminisced
items are produced for the first time at a later delay from
the study event than are forgotten items. In our experi-
ments, we used a between-subjects design where both
groups take multiple tests but the retention intervals are
arranged such that one group takes its second test at the
same lag at which the second group takes its first test.
This procedure allows a comparison of reminisced items
from one group with the forgotten and consistent items
from another group, because the time of the original pro-
duction is the same for reminisced, forgotten, and consist-
ent details.Experiment 1
In this experiment, subjects studied a series of pictures
of simple, nameable objects and were administered mul-
tiple tests of free recall in which to recall those objects.Methods
Subjects
The subjects were 87 University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign undergraduate students participating in ex-
change for course credit. Ten participants had incomplete
data due to computer problems and were excluded from
the analysis.
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The experiment had a two-factor, quasi-experimental de-
sign. The first experimental factor was the number of
tests. Group A (n = 40) took three free-recall tests with a
short retention interval before the second test, and
group B (n = 37) had two recall tests with a long reten-
tion interval. The second, quasi-experimental factor was
response pattern (forgotten, reminisced, and consistent).
The dependent variables were the number and output-
bound accuracy of items recalled.Materials
The stimuli included 60 simple, single-item colored
drawings from Rossion and Pourtois (2001), available at
http://spell.psychology.wustl.edu/Rossion_stimuli/. The im-
ages were displayed on a computer screen in a random
order for 5 seconds, each with a 1-second interstimulus
interval. A Tetris-like, tile-matching puzzle computer
game was used as a distractor task after the study phase.Procedure
Participants were instructed that they were going to be
shown some images and that they should study the images
and try to remember them for a later test. Participants
then viewed all 60 images in a random order. As shown in
Fig. 1, participants in Group A completed a 3-minute
distraction interval, followed by Test 1, then another 3-
minute distraction interval followed by Test 2, then an-
other 3-minute distraction interval followed by Test 3.
Participants in Group B had an 11-minute distraction
interval, followed by Test 1 and then a 3-minute distrac-
tion interval followed by Test 2. All tests were identicalFig. 1 Study design for Experiments 1 and 2other than abbreviated instructions for the second and
third tests; instructions were self-paced with a minimum
exposure of 20 seconds prior to the first test and 5 seconds
prior to the subsequent tests. Each test was a 5-minute
free recall test in which a subject was presented with 60
blanks on the screen and directed to type as many items
as they could remember, in any order, using only 1 word
to name each item. They were encouraged to spend the
entire 5 minutes trying to remember and could not
continue with the experiment until the 5 minutes had
elapsed.
Results and Discussion
Accuracy was assessed using both a within-subject and a
between-subjects comparison. The within-subject com-
parison does not control for time of production, but the
between-subjects comparison does. To ensure greater
compatibility across the groups, the third test for Group
A was ignored for all comparisons except those compar-
ing reminiscence after one test or two; that is, an item
was considered consistent if it was found on Test 1 and
Test 2, regardless of whether it was found on Test 3.
The accuracy and frequency for each response type are
listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The total number
of responses on each test is shown in Table 3.
All results were interpreted using both a strict grading
standard and a lenient grading standard. The strict grad-
ing standard was fully automated and required subjects to
type the exact name of each item, as decided by the ex-
perimenter prior to the experiment. The lenient grading
standard was partially automated. Words that were
deemed incorrect by the strict standard were interpreted
by an experimenter blind to condition, who allowed for
minor misspellings, confusion of plural and singular, and
the use of synonyms. Any corrections were automatically
applied to other errors, ensuring reliability across subjects.Table 1 Output-bound accuracy (SD) for consistent, reminisced,
and forgotten items by time of test on which they were first
output
Experiment 1 Group A Group B Groups A and B
Short Interval Long Interval
Consistent .89 (.16) .92 (.10) .91 (.13)
Forgotten .74 (.32) .72 (.34) .73 (.33)
Reminisced (second test) .69 (.34) .75 (.27) .72 (.31)
Reminisced (third test) .67 (.42)
Experiment 2 Group A Group B Groups A and B
Short Interval Long Interval
Consistent .87 (.10) .86 (.14) .87 (.12)
Forgotten .65 (.39) .61 (.38) .63 (.38)
Reminisced (second test) .71 (.31) .66 (.29) .69 (.30)
Reminisced (third test) .54 (.41)
Table 2 Average frequency (SD) for consistent, reminisced, and
forgotten items by time of test on which they were first output
Experiment 1 Group A Group B Groups A and B
Short Interval Long Interval
Consistent 19.60 (6.55) 22.05 (7.09) 20.78 (6.88)
Forgotten 4.13 (6.74) 2.89 (2.42) 3.53 (5.15)
Reminisced (second test) 5.60 (7.21) 5.68 (4.78) 5.63 (6.12)
Reminisced (third test) 3.60 (6.26)
Experiment 2 Group A Group B Groups A and B
Short Interval Long Interval
Consistent 20.55 (6.60) 19.05 (6.49) 19.81 (6.57)
Forgotten 2.72 (1.82) 2.89 (2.42) 2.80 (2.13)
Reminisced (second test) 3.73 (2.77) 3.82 (3.11) 3.78 (2.94)
Reminisced (third test) 1.97 (1.74)
Fig. 2 Output-bound accuracy as a function of response pattern.
The black bars are from the within-subject contrast, and the gray
bars are from the between-subjects contrast
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the more objective, strict grading standard is reported. All
statistical tests yielded the same conclusions in both grad-
ing schemes unless stated otherwise.
Within-subject effect of response consistency on output-bound
accuracy
This analysis lumps together Group A and Group B and
does not control for time of production. As can be seen
in Fig. 2, consistently recalled items exhibited a higher
degree of output-bound accuracy than either forgotten
(t [64] = 4.50, p < .001) or reminisced (t [67] = 5.69, p < .001)
items. The degrees of freedom were reduced because not
all subjects produced items in each response pattern. The
difference in accuracy between forgotten and reminisced
items was not significant (t [57] = 0.22, p = .83).Between-subjects effect of response consistency on
output-bound accuracy
Some of these comparisons can be made on a between-
subjects basis, which allows us to control for the time of
first output when comparing the accuracy of reminisced
items from Group A with consistently recalled and for-
gotten items from Group B. In the between-subjectsTable 3 Average number of responses (SD) for each test
Experiment 1 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Group A (short interval) 23.73 (9.68) 25.20 (10.54) 22.75 (9.12)
Group B (long interval) 24.96 (7.80) 27.73 (9.27)
Experiment 2 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Group A (short interval) 23.28 (6.52) 24.29 (6.32) 22.32 (6.39)
Group B (long interval) 21.93 (6.16) 22.89 (6.54)comparison, consistently recalled items again revealed
higher accuracy than reminisced items (t [38.09] = 3.83,
p < .001). The difference in accuracy between forgotten and
reminisced items was again not significant (t [62.25] = 0.37,
p = 0.71).
Inconsistencies in recall and overall subject accuracy
A final comparison evaluates whether the inconsistency
of subjects’ recall reveals anything about the accuracy of
their consistently recalled material. As shown in Fig. 3,
there was a negative correlation between the number of
inconsistent items produced across the first two tests and
the accuracy of the consistently produced items (r = −.76,
t [75] = −10.27, p < .001). The correlation remains even
when outliers (more than 2 SD away from the mean
number of inconsistent items or the accuracy) are ex-
cluded (r = −.30, t [71] = −2.65, p = .01).Experiment 2
To evaluate the robustness of the results of Experiment
1, we conducted another experiment with a slightly
more complex encoding scenario. This experiment also
Fig. 3 Accuracy of subject’s consistent items as a function of the
number of inconsistently recalled items. The dashed line represents
the best-fit regression line when the outliers (marked as circles) are
excluded. The solid line represents all data
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versus late reminiscence with somewhat greater power,
as we detail below. In this experiment, we moved toward
more complicated stimuli by using real-world objects
viewed at once rather than a series of images on a com-
puter. This procedure represents a modest increase in
external validity by having items in a physical configur-
ation in which people can see them from different angles,
move closer and further away, examine details present in
real objects, and allocate their attention according to their
motivation. The stimuli still have the advantage of consti-
tuting a set of nameable objects that subjects can easily
produce on a verbal test.Methods
Subjects
Subjects were 150 University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign undergraduate students participating in
exchange for course credit.Design
The design and variables were the same as those in Ex-
periment 1. Group A (n = 76) received three free recall
tests, and Group B (n = 74) received two recall tests.
Materials
The stimuli included 40 common items arranged on a
table (see Appendix 1 for a photograph). The arrange-
ment was the same for all subjects. The items were a
combination of objects that were chosen to be easy to
name. The distractor task and test administration were
the same as those in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Subjects were brought into the laboratory one at a time.
Before entering the room, subjects were told that there
were assorted objects arranged on a table and that their
task was to study the items on the table for 5 minutes.
They were told they could move around the room, but
they were asked not to touch anything. Participants
were then left alone in the room for approximately
5 minutes to study the items. After the study period,
subjects were directed to an adjacent room where they
were to complete the distractor and test phases on a
computer. The rest of the procedure was identical to
that in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
We conducted all the same analyses as those used in
Experiment 1. The accuracy for each response type is
listed in Table 1. The total number of responses on
each test is shown in Table 3.
Within-subject effect of response consistency on output-
bound accuracy
As can be seen in Fig. 2, consistent items exhibited a higher
degree of output-bound accuracy than either forgotten
(t [136] = 7.29, p< .001) or reminisced (t [139] = 7.41, p< .001)
items. The difference in accuracy between forgotten and
reminisced items was not significant (t [131] = 1.06, p= .29).
Between-subjects effect of response consistency on
output-bound accuracy
In the between-subjects comparison (which allows us to
control for the time of output), consistently recalled
items revealed higher accuracy than reminisced items
(t [103.67] = 3.89, p < .001). The difference in accuracy
between forgotten and reminisced items was not sig-
nificant (t [124.01] = 1.58, p = .12).
Inconsistencies in recall and overall subject accuracy
As shown in Fig. 3, there was a negative correlation be-
tween the number of inconsistent items produced across
the first two tests and the accuracy of the consistently
Stanley and Benjamin Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:14 Page 8 of 11produced items (r = −.46, t [147] = −6.26, p < .001). The
correlation remains even when outliers (more than 2
SD away from the mean number of inconsistent items
or the accuracy) are excluded (r = −.23; t [135] = −2.75,
p = .01).3Combined analysis of experiments 1 and 2
Because one of our central findings is a lack of an effect
(between reminisced and forgotten items), we conducted
all of the reported analyses again using pooled data from
both experiments, and we assessed power for each of the
relevant comparisons.Within-subject effect of response consistency on
output-bound accuracy
Consistently recalled items exhibited a higher degree of
output-bound accuracy than forgotten items (t [201] = 8.54,
p < .001). Using Hedges’s gav, as suggested by Lakens (2013)
for use with correlated measures, we found this to be a
large effect size (gav = 0.82). Consistent items also exhibited
a higher degree of output-bound accuracy than reminisced
items (t [207] = 9.34, p < .001). This was also a large effect
(gav = 0.84). Despite high power (.98) to detect a small-to-
medium effect (0.3), no significant difference between
reminisced and forgotten items was found (t [189] = 0.85,
p = 0.40).
Between-subjects effect of response consistency on
output-bound accuracy
In the between-subjects comparison (which allows us to
control for the time of output), consistently recalled
items revealed higher accuracy than reminisced items
(t [143.03] = 5.44, p < .001). Using Hedges’s gs (as rec-
ommended for independent data; Lakens [2013]), we
found this to be a medium-to-large effect size (gs = 0.73).
The difference in accuracy between forgotten and remi-
nisced items was not significant (t [188.75] = 1.10, p = .27),
though it should be noted that the power to detect a
small-to-medium effect (0.3) was only middling (.57).
Inconsistencies in Recall and Overall Subject Accuracy
There was a negative correlation between the number of
inconsistent items produced across the first two tests and
the accuracy of the consistently produced items (r = −.55,
t [224] = −9.77, p < .001). The correlation remains even
when outliers (more than 2 SD away from the mean
number of inconsistent items or the accuracy) are ex-
cluded (r = −.25, t [212] = −3.69, p < .001).
Time of initial output and accuracy of reminisced items
One additional question about reminiscence concerns
the question whether an item reminisced on a later testis less likely to be accurate than an item reminisced on
an earlier test. A post hoc, within-subject comparison
revealed that items first produced on a second test were
significantly more accurate than those produced on a third
test (t [95] = 2.38, p = .02).4,5 The effect size (gav = 0.31) sug-
gests a small-to-medium practical significance.Conclusions
The general view that inconsistencies in recall reflect the
fluctuation of cues across retrieval situations provides a
simple perspective from which to relate the accuracy
and consistency of recalled information. We sought two
specific effects here. First, consistently recalled details
should be more accurate than inconsistently recalled de-
tails, because those memories have proven themselves to
be more robust to the variance of cues across retrieval
conditions. Second, reminisced details—ones produced
in later but not earlier retrieval attempts—should be no
less accurate than forgotten ones, produced in earlier
but not later attempts. Both of these predictions were
confirmed and are consistent with some prior work
using eyewitness paradigms (Krix et al., 2015; Oeberst,
2015). The work reported here is the first that makes
these comparisons under conditions in which retention
interval is deconfounded from response type.
Additionally, we found that items reminisced on an
earlier test were significantly more accurate than those
reminisced on a later test. However, because of generally
low power in those between-subjects contrasts, the ef-
fect of time on the accuracy of reminiscence can only be
considered provisional and awaits further evidence.
Finally, we also found across both our experiments
that the more inconsistencies a person had, the less accur-
ate the person’s consistently produced items were. That is,
there was a correlation between the number of inconsist-
ent items that a subject produced and the accuracy of the
individual’s consistently recalled items. Although this re-
sult appears inconsistent with the findings of Gilbert and
Fisher (2006), the magnitude of the correlation between
overall accuracy and number of reminisced details in their
work (r = −.15) is comparable to the magnitude of our cor-
relations when outliers are excluded.
In the theoretical picture provided here, the overlap
between cues present at retrieval and those cues encoded
at the time of the original event determines the likelihood
of recall. Inconsistencies arise because of random fluctua-
tions (and maybe nonrandom ones as well) with time and
intervening events. Individual differences in the level of
evidence that a rememberer demands prior to producing a
memory yield the relationship between accuracy and
consistency at the subject level.
Of course, the overlap in cues in our work is an en-
tirely theoretical entity. There is no specification of the
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(cf. Divis & Benjamin, 2014). Yet, it is interesting to con-
sider what sorts of operational variables might reflect
this overlap. One possibility is that self-reported confi-
dence could be used as a measure. It is already known
that confidence reflects a metamnemonic assessment of
accuracy, is meaningfully related to accuracy, and deter-
mines the probability of reporting (Goldsmith & Koriat,
2008). If confidence is taken as a measure of cue overlap,
then it should mediate the relationship between accuracy
and consistency (see Odinot & Wolters, 2006). Indeed,
confidence appears to be lower for inconsistently produced
than for consistently produced details in an eyewitness re-
port (Odinot, Wolters, & van Koppen, 2009), though its
mediating role is unclear from that work. Given the central
importance of confidence in other arenas of eyewitness
behavior (Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger,
2015), this would seem to be a fruitful avenue for future
research.Consistency of recall and the legal system
Witnesses are often asked to describe a witnessed event
on multiple occasions ranging over a wide period of time
and a variety of circumstances. The legal system relies
on witnesses to recount events consistently each time
they are asked, but this reflects a misguided perspective
on the nature of human memory. The critical depend-
ence of memory on contextual cues, many of which are
not under the rememberer’s control, suggests that incon-
sistencies across circumstances should be common. Here
we show that repeated attempts to recall a set of items
lead to many inconsistencies and that such inconsist-
ently produced information is less accurate than consist-
ently produced information. This finding is compatible
with the behavior of lawyers who argue for the unreli-
ability of inconsistently produced information. We also
found that people who had more inconsistencies in their
recall were less accurate overall. This is an important
finding that deserves verification across a wider range of
study and testing circumstances. If these findings are
replicated across a variety of different procedures, in-
cluding ones that use eyewitness memory tasks, it would
suggest that less weight should be placed on an eyewit-
ness’s account if the eyewitness produces many inconsist-
encies. This result is also consistent with the behavior of
lawyers who use inconsistencies to more generally im-
peach a witness’s credibility. However, the ubiquity of
inconsistencies must be kept in mind—it is only those
eyewitnesses who exhibit a tendency for excessive
amounts of inconsistent recall who should be regarded
with suspicion.
It is important to acknowledge certain limitations in
attempting to generalize the results of this research totrue eyewitness scenarios. Our research involved only
people who have no incentive to lie; there is very little
pressure to provide answers and no penalty for provid-
ing incorrect answers; retention intervals are short; and
our tests are strictly free-recall with no opportunity for
subjects to gain additional information. Additionally, as
discussed previously, real eyewitnesses report on events,
not on lists.
Our research, as well as that of others (Gilbert &
Fisher, 2006; Krix et al., 2015; Oeberst, 2012, 2015), does
suggest that inconsistencies are common among people
with no incentive to lie; as such, small or few inconsist-
encies should not be considered an indication of dishon-
esty or general inaccuracy. However, because we have
not measured inconsistencies within subjects with a
motivation to lie it remains possible that higher levels
of inconsistency may, in fact, be indicative of lying.
In addition, there appears to be no reason to view
reminisced details with especial suspicion. Reminisced
information appears to be comparable in accuracy to
forgotten information, indicating that the court’s par-
ticular distrust of reminisced items may be unfounded.
Inconsistent details should be accorded less trust, but
the nature of the inconsistency does not appear to
matter.Endnotes
1A third type of inconsistency, contradiction, in which
details change across accounts, is not addressed separ-
ately here.
2These numbers were obtained by averaging across the
conditions listed on the left side of Table 2 (p. 732) and
were weighted by the number of participants per condi-
tion listed in Table 1 (p. 730; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006).
3When lenient grading was used, the correlation was
significant before removing outliers (r = −.30, t [147] =
3.86, p < .001) but was not significant when outliers more
than 2 SD away from the mean were excluded (r = −0.15,
t [136] = 1.78, p = .08)
4The within-subject comparison offers high power
(.83) but confounds the time of original output with the
number of failed retrieval attempts prior to being out-
put. This can be deconfounded with two between-
subjects comparisons which revealed that items first
output on an earlier test were significantly more accur-
ate than those output first on a later test (t [175.02] =
2.08, p = .04); however, the accuracy of reminisced
items did not depend on when an item was first output
(t [205.93] = 0.23, p = .82). The power in these compari-
sons to detect a medium effect was middling (.58 and
.56, respectively).
5This difference was not statistically significant when
lenient grading was used (t [76] = 1.29, p = .20).
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